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ABSTRACT
Although much has been written about the so-called political, ethical 
and religious turns in the thinking of Jacques Derrida, few have no-
ticed that his late writings were marked by what we could tentatively 
call a “zoological turn.” This is surprising given that in The Animal 
That Therefore I Am Derrida clearly stated that the question as to what 
distinguishes the human from the animal has for him always been the 
most important question of philosophy. This essay will attempt to of-
fer a preliminary exploration of this still largely uncharted aspect of 
Derrida’s thought. Starting from a brief overview of Derrida’s most 
important writings on the question of the animal, it will be argued 
that his decision to write an entire book on this issue was largely mo-
tivated by his eagerness to settle a discussion with one of his pupils, 
the French theorist of technology Bernard Stiegler.
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In a collection of lectures published as The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida elaborates a critique of “the 
gesture [that] seems to constitute philosophy as such” (2008, 
40), namely the positing of a single and indivisible dividing 
line separating the animal from the human. For Derrida, the 
question of the animal is, therefore, not one more pressing 
question among many others, but probably “the most important 
and decisive question” (2008, 34), a question which he says to 
“have addressed a thousand times, either directly or obliquely, 
by means of readings of all the philosophers I have taken an 
interest in” (2008, 34). Hence, what for Derrida secretly unites 
Descartes, Kant, Levinas, Lacan and Heidegger is that these 
thinkers simply oppose the Animal to the Human by denying 
all animals certain qualities that are supposedly only proper to 
man (2008). To counter this tradition, Derrida will, however, 
not give back to the animal what man has always deprived it 
of―a gesture that risks introducing biological continuism and 
all the dangerous implications thereof―but argue that all living 
beings, including the human, suffer a radical powerlessness.
Although the publication of The Animal That Therefore I 
Am aroused an increasing interest in what could tentatively be 
called Derrida’s “zoological turn,” few have noticed that he 
did not write this work to open a new area of research, but 
rather aimed to elucidate an approach to this issue that he had 
already been defending at least since the early nineties. Start-
ing from a brief overview of Derrida’s most important writings 
on the question of the animal, I will show that his critique of 
the anthropocentric bias in Western thought in this book does 
no longer simply concern the view that man is superior to the 
animal by having some transcendental quality, but, on the con-
trary, by having no qualities whatsoever. The reason for this 
change of discourse is that Derrida wanted to demarcate his 
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own approach more clearly from that of a former pupil of his. 
Indeed, Derrida’s main argument in The Animal That Therefore 
I Am that the Western philosophical tradition considers man’s 
superiority over the animal to be the result of an “originary 
fault,” as well as the fact that he sees the basic structure of this 
argument most overtly formulated in the Greek myth of Pro-
metheus and Epimetheus, are clearly references to the work of 
Bernard Stiegler who made precisely of Epimetheus’s fault the 
emblem of his multiple-volume work Technics and Time. To 
conclude, I will suggest that Stiegler’s project to think anthro-
pogenesis as mutually constitutive with technogenesis should 
itself be understood as an attempt to correct what he thought to 
be Derrida’s insufficient elaboration of the question regarding 
the singularity of the human animal.
Derrida’s statement about the central importance of the 
question of the animal in his work arrives rather unexpectedly. 
Indeed, at first sight this claim seems to be in flagrant contra-
diction with the simple fact that Derrida apparently has not ad-
dressed this question as a specific subject of inquiry prior to 
the publication of The Animal That Therefore I Am. To be sure, 
there has never been a lack of animal figures in Derrida’s texts, 
but the strategic functions these animal figures fulfill are usu-
ally highly context-dependent and text-specific and certainly 
do not set the stage for a more profound investigation of the 
larger stakes of this issue. And yet, there nevertheless seems 
to be every reason to take this claim seriously. As if he wants 
to convince his readers that he is not merely using a hyperbole 
when making this claim, Derrida bluntly declares in this text 
that “logocentrism is first of all a thesis concerning the animal” 
(2008, 27). Derrida’s versatility as a thinker renders it well-
nigh impossible to detect an overarching theme in his writings. 
But it would certainly not be inaccurate to state that his critique 
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of logocentrism―Western philosophy’s assumption that there 
is a foundational principle of being and that this principle can 
be grasped through reason and discourse―motivates nearly all 
of his readings of texts of the Western philosophical tradition. 
Looking back at his early writings such as Of Grammatology 
(1974) and Writing and Difference (1978) from this perspec-
tive, one could indeed argue that the “quasi-transcendental” 
concepts he elaborated in these works, such as the trace, the 
grammē and arche-writing, can also be read as potentially hold-
ing a strong critique of the rigid human/animal distinction be-
queathed by the tradition. But even if we grant him the benefit 
of the doubt and assume that he did not merely retrospectively 
project a more recent sensitivity onto his early work, this is-
sue was surely not at the centre of Derrida’s attention at that 
time. It was therefore generally assumed, and even more so fol-
lowing the so-called ethical turn of deconstruction marked by 
the growing influence of the work Levinas on Derrida, that his 
critique of logocentrism was mainly intended to call attention 
to the many forms of human alterity that come to disturb the 
self-certain subject. However, if we follow Derrida’s lead we 
should try to understand that this critique was above all meant 
to be a critique of the age-old presupposition that the “animal 
other” is deprived of logos.
One of the first times Derrida explicitly addressed this issue 
was in an interview with Elisabeth Roudinesco. Here Derrida 
argues that the relations between humans and animals must 
change drastically and adds that this is not merely an “ontologi-
cal necessity,” but also, and especially today, an “ethical duty” 
(2004, 64). In contrast to his brief and rather purely theoretical 
reflections on this issue in earlier texts, on this occasion and in 
The Animal That Therefore I Am he even goes as far as stating 
that “a war has been declared on so many animals” (2004, 67) 
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and that the violence inflicted upon them could even be com-
pared “to the worst cases of genocide” (2008, 26). Many con-
sider this comparison between the slaughtering of animals and 
the systematic liquidation of human beings totally unacceptable 
because it illegitimately equates the worst cases of human suf-
fering and the treatment of animals in big industry. We would, 
however, completely misunderstand Derrida’s intention if we 
take it to mean that he is blind to the fundamental differences 
between these two kinds of suffering, or even worse, that he 
abuses the suffering of those who were murdered in genocides 
to call attention to the suffering of animals. His point is not that 
we put too much weight on human suffering in comparison to 
animal suffering, but that we do not pay enough attention to 
the singularity of animal suffering. As Matthew Callarco has 
argued,
The very difficult task for thought here is to bear the 
burden of thinking through both kinds of suffering in 
their respective singularity and to notice relevant simi-
larities and parallel logics at work where they exist. To 
do so requires abandoning… the hierarchical humanist 
metaphysics that we have inherited from the ontotheo-
logical tradition (2008, 112).
The common opinion that human life is intrinsically more valu-
able than animal life is deeply embedded in Western tradition 
and culture and it will therefore take more than rational argu-
mentation and political commitment to bring about a radical 
reorientation of our value system. So although Derrida declares 
to have much sympathy for initiatives such as those of the ani-
mal rights movement (2004, 74), he is far from convinced that 
the violence against animals could be stopped or lessened by 
simply granting them legally sanctioned rights. For not only is 
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it exactly the Cartesian model of subjectivity upon which the 
modern concept of rights is founded that he considers to be 
responsible for justifying anthropocentric violence in the first 
place, but he also clearly states that he has “never believed in 
some homogenous continuity between what calls itself man 
and what he calls the animal” (2008, 30). This latter statement 
is clearly directed at animal rights theorists such as Peter Singer 
who argue that one should grant “human” rights to those ani-
mals that are endowed with sufficiently developed cognitive 
capacities. Since Derrida takes this to imply that certain species 
of animals are to be considered superior to, for example, men-
tally-ill persons, he calls such strategies that deny any qualita-
tive difference between humans and animals nothing less than 
“ridiculous and heinous” (2004, 67).
It should be clear, then, that Derrida takes issue with both 
dominant positions in the discussion of the human/animal rela-
tion. It is no surprise though that the largest part of his writ-
ings on this problem deal with the anthropocentric bias of the 
continental philosophical tradition. His main critique of this 
tradition is that it has always given man a privileged position 
among the living creatures by endowing him with qualities, es-
sences or “propers” such as language, consciousness, reason 
or moral awareness, which animals apparently do not possess. 
At the same time, however, he seems to be equally critical of 
those who strive to undo the metaphysical separation of man 
and animal by giving back to the animal the qualities that man 
has always deprived it of. According to Derrida, such a view 
does not take sufficiently into account the singularity of all liv-
ing beings. In other words, Derrida aims to undo the radical hu-
man/animal binary, but at the same time he also wants to avoid 
putting man on the same ontological level as the animal. The 
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question is, of course, whether it is actually possible to steer 
clear from both of these positions. 
It seems as if the full import of this problem only started 
to dawn on him in the wake of his critical confrontation with 
Heidegger’s thought. It is well-known that Heidegger was an 
ardent critic of the many forms of “ontotheological humanism” 
that populate the philosophical universe and it would therefore 
have seemed reasonable for Derrida to assume that Heidegger’s 
writings contain a thinking that does not take for granted the 
radical human/animal divide. It is probably with this expecta-
tion in mind that in Of Spirit (1989) Derrida ventured a critical 
reading of Heidegger’s only text that explicitly broaches the 
problem of the being of the animal, namely The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics (1995). The guiding threat of Hei-
degger’s argument in this lecture course is constituted by three 
theses: the stone is wordless, the animal is poor in world and 
man is world-forming. Derrida calls particular attention to the 
obscurity of the second thesis: what does being poor in world 
mean? Heidegger is quick to argue that this thesis certainly 
does not imply that there is a difference in degree between the 
human and the animal in the sense that the animal has only 
limited access to the entities in the world to which the human 
would have full access. Given that Heidegger clearly states that 
“every animal and every species of animal as such is just as 
perfect and complete as any other” (Heidegger 1995, 194), it is 
certainly not the case that these characterizations should be tak-
en as an evaluative ranking of some sort. Yet, the animal must 
certainly have some access to the world, otherwise it could not 
be distinguished from the stone of which he said that it has no 
access to the world at all. The animal, Heidegger will conclude, 
has access to entities, but it does not have access to entities as 
such. Derrida comments as follows:
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This analysis, certainly, has the interest of breaking 
with difference of degree. It respects a difference of 
structure while avoiding anthropocentrism. But it re-
mains bound to reintroduce the measure of man by the 
very route it claimed to be withdrawing that measure—
this meaning of lack and privation (1989, 49).
 A lizard lying on a rock, to use one of Heidegger’s examples, 
certainly relates to that rock in some way, but it certainly does 
not relate to the rock as such. The animal, Heidegger argues, 
is completely captivated (benommen) or absorbed by the enti-
ties that constitute its environment and therefore cannot have a 
free relationship to them. It always has a relation of utility with 
the entities it encounters and therefore cannot let the rock be 
what it is. Since the animal is captivated by its environment, 
the possibility to apprehend something as something is struc-
turally withheld from the animal (Heidegger 1995, 247). This 
phenomenological possibility to reveal an entity in its being is 
reserved for Dasein only. Derrida concludes:
I do not mean to criticize this humanist teleology. It 
is no doubt more urgent to recall that, in spite of all 
the denegations or all the avoidances one would wish, 
it has remained up till now… the price to be paid in 
the ethico-political denunciation of biologism, racism, 
naturalism, etc. (1989, 56).
The question is then whether Derrida himself found a way to 
avoid the twin pitfalls of metaphysical humanism and bio-
logical reductionism. At the time Derrida wrote Of Spirit he 
still seemed to be very skeptical about the prospects to actu-
ally achieve this goal. Heidegger’s case is exemplary in this 
respect. Although he consistently rejected both the reduction of 
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Dasein to a biological entity and the metaphysical determina-
tion of man as a rational animal, Derrida points out that in his 
notorious rectoral speech, “The Self-Assertion of the German 
University” (1993), Heidegger capitalizes on both evils at the 
same time by spiritualizing the forces of “earth-and-blood.” He 
consequently ends up combining “the sanctioning of nazism 
and the gesture that is still metaphysical” (Derrida 1989, 40). 
Having become aware that it is simply impossible to twist one-
self completely free from both humanism and biologism, the 
question for Derrida then becomes that of knowing which is 
the least grave form of complicity with these two “evils.” In Of 
Spirit he does not yet elaborate such a negotiation with the an-
thropological limit, but he does give an indication of how one 
would probably have to proceed: 
[C]an one not say just as legitimately that the having-
a-world also has for man the signification of some un-
heimliche privation of world, and that these two values 
are not opposed (1989, 50)? 
This is indeed the strategy that Derrida will follow in Aporias 
(1993). In the second essay of this short book, “Awaiting (at) 
the Arrival,” Derrida reminds us that Heidegger opened his Be-
ing and Time by arguing that Dasein is the only entity in the 
world that has the ability to question its own being and that an 
analysis of its existentials provides a privileged starting point to 
reopen the question of being as such. In the second part of his 
magnum opus, Heidegger shows that Dasein’s exceptionality 
resides in the fact that it is the only entity that has an experi-
ence of death. Only human Dasein can die, animals simply per-
ish. Death, in other words, is Dasein’s most proper possibility. 
But, Derrida objects, is death not exactly an experience that 
will never present itself to Dasein and thus actually its most im-
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proper possibility? No one will be able to experience his own 
death, no one will be able to “live” this experience. From this 
perspective, the relationship between Dasein and the animal 
suddenly appears in a very different light:
But if the impossibility of the “as such” is indeed the 
impossibility of the “as such,” it is also what cannot 
appear as such. Indeed, this relation to the disappearing 
as such of the “as such”—the “as such” that Heidegger 
makes the distinctive mark and the specific ability of 
Dasein—is also the characteristic common both to the 
inauthentic and to the authentic forms of the existence 
of Dasein, common to all experiences of death and 
also, outside of Dasein, common to all living beings in 
general (Derrida 1993, 75).
Heidegger’s metaphysical humanism is here defeated on its 
own terrain. To be sure, not by granting animals access to death 
“as such,” but, on the contrary, by showing that Dasein does 
not have that access either.
Human finitude, Derrida recapitulates in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, does not reside in man’s ability to run ahead 
towards death, but in the fact that man is not able to experi-
ence death as such, in a lack of power, in a not-having of the 
“as such.” This brings the human in close proximity to the ani-
mal. The most important question, Derrida argues, is therefore 
not whether animals do or do not have access to logos, speech, 
spirit, tekhnē, death, and the like, but to know whether animals 
can suffer. Being able to suffer is precisely this possibility with-
out power, this radical finitude that man shares with the animal. 
At the time of the writing of The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, however, Derrida seems to have become aware of the fact 
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that this line of thinking could also clear the way for a more 
subtle version of anthropocentric thought. This strand of an-
thropocentrism would not oppose the lack of the animal to the 
plenitude of the human, but claims that man’s superiority over 
the animal derives precisely from his deficient nature or his 
originary default:
[We will] see appear in every discourse concerning 
the animal, and notably in Western philosophical dis-
course, the same dominant, the same recurrence of a 
schema that is in truth invariable…: what is proper to 
man, his subjugating superiority over the animal… 
would derive from his originary fault, indeed from this 
default in propriety (Derrida 2008, 45).
The qualities that make man superior to the animal, such as 
logos, mind, language, etc., are not simply gratuitous gifts from 
God or from Nature, but emerge from his peculiar position as a 
deprived being. This would be the fundamental logic underpin-
ning all metaphysical discourses concerning the human/animal 
divide. Unlike the animal, man does not have a fixed nature and 
that would paradoxically explain why is he is able to gain ac-
cess to these various defining traits. Leonard Lawlor has argued 
that this schema can be found in nearly all traditions of Western 
thought, but that it is most clearly present in those traditions 
that assume the fallen nature of man such as Platonism and 
Christianity:
Because of a fault, man conceives animals as being ab-
solutely innocent, prior to good and evil, “without fault 
or defect.” The animals therefore do not seem to suffer 
a fall… in contrast, man is not perfect; he has fallen 
and has a fault, which allows him to question. The abil-
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ity to question brings us to the axiom: it is precisely 
“a fault or defect” in man, in us, that allows us to be 
masters over the animals (2007, 67).
Man would have suffered a fatal fall as a result of which he 
paradoxically attains a privileged position among the living be-
ings, “[t]his would be the law of an imperturbable logic, both 
Promethean and Adamic, both Greek and Abrahamic (Judaic, 
Christian, Islamic)” (Derrida 2008, 20). Whence this sudden 
change of discourse? It almost seems as if Derrida’s argument 
that man also suffers from a deficient constitution, that man is 
also “poor in world,” had somehow started to boomerang back 
on him so that he thought it was now necessary to ward off 
the suspicion that his own writings would be open to such an 
interpretation.
In fact, there were certainly good reasons for Derrida to 
hold such a suspicion. In 1994, the French philosopher Ber-
nard Stiegler published a book called The Fault of Epimetheus 
(1998) in which he argues that the origin of the human is nei-
ther to be found in some transcendental quality, nor in a par-
ticular genetic makeup, but in the structural coupling of a liv-
ing being with its technical instruments. Significantly, Stiegler 
finds support for his argument in the myth of Prometheus and 
Epimetheus (1998, 185-203). Since this story contains in broad 
outlines the central features of Stiegler’s philosophy, it seems 
worthwhile to summarize it here. In Protagoras’ version of this 
story as narrated by Plato, Epimetheus convinces his brother 
Prometheus to entrust him with the task of distributing quali-
ties or powers among the living creatures that was commended 
by Zeus. The Titan performs his task by allotting each creature 
one specific quality making sure that there is an equilibrium 
between the species. But when it was time for the humans to 
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receive their due, Epimetheus suddenly realizes that he had 
already handed out all available qualities. When Prometheus 
arrives at the scene to inspect his brother’s work, he notices 
that the humans are still naked and without means of defense. 
Because he is worried that their premature constitution could 
lead to the total destruction of mankind, Prometheus decides to 
make up for Epimetheus’ fault and goes out to steal the techni-
cal skills and fire from the gods to compensate humans for their 
lack of qualities. What Stiegler wants to stress in his reading 
of this myth is the fundamental undefinability of the human or 
what he calls man’s “default of origin.” Hence, technics is not 
proper to the human either, but merely an external prosthesis 
that is only adopted afterwards, by default, to compensate for 
an originary lack of property. 
There is little doubt that Derrida was mainly targeting 
Stiegler when he criticized those who hold that what is proper 
to man derives from his originary fault. Since Stiegler wrote his 
first volume of Technics and Time when he was a doctoral stu-
dent of Derrida, the two must in any case have certainly been 
very familiar with each other’s work. Moreover, in “Quand 
faire c’est dire” (“When to do is to say”) (1994), an article that 
appeared shortly before The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler al-
ready explained that his theory should be understood as an at-
tempt to resolve the question of the difference between man 
and animal which he thought Derrida has left in the air. In this 
article, Stiegler revisits Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in Of 
Spirit that we discussed earlier. If man is also “poor in world” 
and his relation to the world is equally “guided by a narrow 
sphere of drives, of desires” (Derrida 2008, 159) and the like, 
Stiegler argues, then there still remains to be determined what 
is the human mode of being poor in world. In other words, if 
man is also a programmed being, if he does not have unmedi-
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ated access to the world either, then the specificity of the human 
program still remains to be thought. Indeed, Derrida’s argument 
only seems to beg the question. For if man and animal share a 
radical powerlessness, does he not end up endorsing some kind 
of continuism after all? Derrida seems to have anticipated such 
objections and counters them as follows:
I am not advocating the blurring of differences. On the 
contrary, I am trying to explain how drawing an oppo-
sitional limit itself blurs the differences, the différance 
and the differences, not only between man and animal, 
but among animal societies—there are an infinite num-
ber of animal societies, and, within the animal societies 
and within human society itself, so many differences 
(1987, 183).  
But even if it is indeed the case that the philosophical tradi-
tion has always treated “the animal” as one homogenous cat-
egory and consequently neglected the singularity of animal life, 
then we still bear the burden to determine what constitutes the 
singularity of the human animal. In order to steer clear from 
traditional metaphysical prejudices, Stiegler will answer this 
question by showing that the transition from the animal to the 
human is not the transition from a fully programmed living be-
ing to a being guided by no program whatsoever, but the transi-
tion from a genetic program to a techno-logical or what he calls 
epiphylogenetic program.
In the beginning of the third chapter of The Fault of Epi-
metheus, Stiegler writes that what is at stake in this book is 
“to think the birth of the human… and to attempt this inde-
pendently of all anthropologism” (1998, 135). Stiegler finds a 
suitable point of departure for this project in the work of the 
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French paleontologist André Leroi-Gourhan. What is particu-
larly interesting for Stiegler is that Leroi-Gourhan describes 
anthropogenesis as a process of “exteriorization” in the course 
of which the brain and the tool develop at equal pace. As this 
non-anthropocentric concept defies the classical image of the 
human as an animal to which miraculously the capacity for re-
flection is added, it seriously calls into question the radical op-
position between the human and the animal. A crucial event for 
the development of Leroi-Gourhan’s theory was the discovery 
of the remains of the Australopithecus together with its flint 
tools in 1959. According to Leroi-Gourhan, this was the first 
bipedal humanoid to have benefited from exteriorization. What 
is so important about this paleontological finding is that the 
small size of the Australopithecus’ brain pan urges the conclu-
sion that what was decisive in anthropogenesis was not cere-
bral development, but the erect posture and the new functional 
organization of the body that ensued from this novelty in the 
history of life:
The “freeing” of the hand during locomotion is also 
that of the face from its grasping functions. The hand 
will necessarily call for tools, movable organs; the 
tools of the hand will necessarily call for the language 
of the face. The brain obviously plays a role, but it is 
no longer directive: it is but a partial element of a total 
apparatus, even if the evolution of the apparatus tends 
towards the deployment of the cerebral cortex (Stiegler 
1998, 145).
The erect posture brought about a gradual suspension of genet-
ic constraints and, consequently, an increasing indetermination 
of the body functions. The immediate result was the appearance 
of tools and language to fill in for this lack of genetic program-
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mability. Moreover, Stiegler writes, between the Australopithe-
cus and the Neanderthalian tools evolved so slowly “that one 
hardly can imagine the human as its operator, rather, one much 
more readily imagines the human as what is invented” (1998, 
134). This will be Stiegler’s thesis: the birth of the human is the 
appearance of technics in the sense that the human and technics 
“invent each other respectively, as if there were a technological 
maieutic of what is called ‘humanity’” (1998, 142), the cortex 
being informed by the tool as much as the tool by the cortex.
Leroi-Gourhan, however, will maintain that from the Aus-
tralopithecus up to the Neanderthalian, “tools were still, to a 
large extent, a direct emanation of species behavior” (1993, 
97), which means that he thinks that in this archaic period of 
thousands of years technical evolution was still mainly deter-
mined by the rhythm of cortical development, itself propelled 
by genetic selection, and thus essentially of zoological origin. 
According to the paleontologist it is only with the emergence 
of the Neanderthalian that technical evolution frees itself com-
pletely from genetic constraints. So although Leroi-Gourhan 
argues that the fact that the Australopithecus could already han-
dle tools implies that this humanoid must have had a “technical 
consciousness,” he thinks he was still not yet endowed with 
a full-fledged “symbolic consciousness,” something that will 
only emerge with the Neanderthalian when an extraordinary 
increase in anticipatory capacities was accompanied with the 
stabilization of the evolution of man’s neuro-equipment. What 
is at issue here is the latitude that became available with exte-
riorization and the origins thereof. Stiegler argues that Leroi-
Gourhan was wrong to say that the Australopithecus did not yet 
posses a symbolic consciousness. This thesis contradicts the 
simple fact that the Australopithecus must already have had the 
capacity for anticipation because the possibility to perform a 
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technical gesture requires, as Leroi-Gourhan himself explains, 
“a good deal of foresight on the part of the individual perform-
ing the sequence of technical operations” (1993, 97). So al-
though Leroi-Gourhan came close to recognizing that the birth 
of the human coincides with the birth of technics, in the end he 
gives a determining role to cortical development, implying that 
the Australopithecus was still an animal and that the genuine 
origin of the human is the acquisition of a faculty for symbol-
ization. This is a conclusion that Stiegler cannot accept:
There is no such [second] origin because technical dif-
ferentiation presupposes full-fledged anticipation, at 
once operative and dynamic, from the Australanthro-
pian onwards, and such anticipation can only be a rela-
tion to death, which means that symbolic intellectuality 
must equally be already there. Reflective intellectuality 
is not added to technical intelligence. It was already its 
ground (1998, 163).
The difficulty Leroi-Gourhan found himself confronted with, 
Stiegler argues, is the ambiguity of the term “exteriorization.” 
It gives the impression that what is exteriorized should be pre-
ceded by some kind of (mental) interiority, something that 
would function as the origin of this movement. But given the 
fact that Leroi-Gourhan himself had asserted that the brain was 
only a beneficiary of the rupture of exteriorization, there can-
not be anything of that kind, whether it be in the guise of a 
neurological impetus or a premature consciousness. What has 
therefore remained unthought is the possibility that the “inte-
rior and exterior are… constituted in a movement that invents 
both one and the other” (Stiegler 1998, 142), so that “neither 
one precedes the other, neither is the origin of the other, the 
origin being the coming into adequacy [con-venance] or the 
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simultaneous arrival of the two” (1998, 152). The challenge is 
to think what Stiegler calls a “mirror proto-stage” or an “instru-
mental maieutics,” the structural coupling of the human and 
technics that makes the constitution of the one impossible and 
unthinkable without the other.  
It is at this stage of his argumentation that Stiegler calls upon 
Derridean différance which Stiegler in this context understands 
as the history of life in which are articulated different stages 
of the grammē. Significantly, Derrida also based his concept 
of the grammē on what Leroi-Gourhan calls the liberation or 
exteriorization of programs. More specifically, Derrida finds in 
Leroi-Gourhan’s notion of “program” a “non-anthropocentric 
concept that does not take for granted the usual divides be-
tween animality and humanity” (Stiegler 1998, 137):
Leroi-Gourhan no longer describes the unity of man 
and the human adventure thus by the simple possibil-
ity of the graphie in general; rather as a stage or an 
articulation in the history of life—of what I called dif-
férance—as the history of the grammē… this move-
ment goes far beyond the possibilities of the ‘inten-
tional consciousness.’ It is an emergence that makes 
the grammē appear as such... if the expression ventured 
by Leroi-Gourhan is accepted, one could speak of a 
‘liberation of memory,’ of an exteriorization always al-
ready begun but always larger than the trace which, be-
ginning from the elementary programs of so-called ‘in-
stinctive’ behavior up to the constitution of electronic 
card-indexes and reading machines enlarges différance 
and the possibility of putting in reserve (Derrida 1974, 
84). 
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Since the grammē does not only concern genetic inscription, 
but also “electronic card indexes” and “reading machines,” in 
other words, means of technical inscription, it seems that the 
program is operative on both sides of the human/animal divide. 
But, Stiegler argues, it is nonetheless true that this transition 
from a genetic to a non-genetic program coincides with the ap-
pearance of the human and an account of the specificity of this 
passage is exactly what is still missing in Derrida’s writings.  
The emergence of the human, Stiegler will conclude, coin-
cides with the appearance of a third type of memory or program 
in the evolution of the living. First, there is genetic memory, 
which is common to all living beings and which remains strict-
ly internal to the organism. Second, there is epigenetic memory, 
individually acquired experiences that are stored in the central 
nervous system of the living organism. The central axiom of 
molecular biology states that these two memories do not com-
municate with each other in the sense that the flow of infor-
mation in organisms runs from the DNA to the proteins, from 
the genotype to the phenotype, but not the other way around. 
This means that individual acquired experiences are lost with 
the death of the organism. With the birth of the human, how-
ever, there emerged a third kind of memory that Stiegler calls 
epiphylogenetic memory―memory embodied in technical ob-
jects. Since the human is capable of exteriorizing its epigenetic 
memory in material supports―from stone tools to digital stor-
ing devices―it can preserve and transmit this memory across 
generations. It is this suspension of the law of life that accord-
ing to Stiegler constitutes the specificity or singularity of the 
human animal. 
Critics such as Ben Roberts (2005) and Geoffrey Bennington 
(1996) have argued, however, that it is not so much Derrida’s 
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interpretation of Leroi-Gourhan that is lacking in clarity, but 
Stiegler’s appropriation of it. While Derrida’s quasi-concepts 
such as the grammē and the trace precisely challenge the oppo-
sition between the human and the animal, Stiegler’s distinction 
between epigenesis and epiphylogenesis would simply repro-
duce this opposition in terms of technicity. By insisting on the 
fact that the human is the only living being that is able to con-
serve its memory in technical objects, Stiegler would merely 
have invented a more subtle form of anthropocentrism. As we 
have seen, this also seems to be Derrida’s own critique of Stie-
gler’s theory of anthropogenesis.   
I think, however, that we would do injustice to Stiegler’s 
philosophy if we read it as simply implying that technics is the 
defining property of man since his argument is precisely that 
there is nothing proper to the human. If the danger of anthropo-
centrism is most critical when it straightforwardly opposes the 
animal to the human, then no worse could be done than to install 
an insurmountable gap between them on the basis of some tran-
scendental property. In this respect Stiegler’s refutation of what 
he calls the “miracle thesis” (1998, 161), that is, the positing of 
some form of “spirituality” without a rational understanding of 
its provenance, is rather an attempt to diminish anthropocentric 
violence than its continuation by other means. Moreover, the 
suppression of both overt and latent anthropocentrism could 
just as well lead to its opposite, namely the effacing of all dif-
ferences between the animal and the human. As Stiegler puts it, 
“the contestation of oppositions must not eliminate the genesis 
of differences” (1998, 163).  
When asked in an interview what he thinks about the fact 
that certain primates also use tools and transmit this knowledge 
to the next generation, Stiegler responds as follows:
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If you would object to me that certain large apes also 
have cultures, then I would say that I am willing to ac-
cept them as members of the world which starts with 
the human—in other words, as embryonic fabricators 
of this third type of memory. I would most certainly 
allow them to enter human history. As a matter of fact, 
that is the reason why they are so close to us (2004, 49, 
my trans.).
Arthur Bradley has argued that this way of responding to this 
objection can only confirm the impression that Stiegler vio-
lently “absorbs every apparent exception into the narrative of 
hominisation” (2006, 98). I think, however, that such an inter-
pretation arises because it is almost impossible to use the name 
of “man” without inheriting the metaphysical assumptions per-
taining to this term. That is the reason why Heidegger uses the 
term Dasein to designate human being and why Stiegler prefers 
to call this entity simply the “who.” In other words, Stiegler 
is not primarily interested in the entity we unreflectively call 
“man,” but in the structure of experience that opens up when 
a living being enters into a mutual constitutive relation with 
technical objects:
I’m not interested in what we call “man” but in tempo-
rality, temporality that, as a form of life, has to decide 
what it is to become (and it so happens that this form 
of life is still called man today). Even when man is 
finished, when he belongs to the past, this form of life 
may well continue on, becoming ever more complex – 
and perhaps man is already finished (2003, 158).
Thinking anthropogenesis as mutually constitutive with tech-
nogenesis implies that the human is not a spiritual miracle that 
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is added to an animal body, but that hominization is “the pur-
suit of the evolution of the living by other means than life” 
(1998, 135). Hominization is not a break with life, but a break 
in life. Whether this negotiation with the anthropological limit 
will stop generating new controversies about the most impor-
tant and decisive question of philosophy remains, however, to 
be seen.
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